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Vice President of Enrollment Management

Position: Vice President of Marketing and Enrollment

Management

Reports to: President

Location: Manchester, NH

Website: www.snhu.ed

Southern New Hampshire University trains intellectually and culturally enriched individuals to be successful in their careers and contribute to their communities.
SNHU’s educational philosophy challenges students’ intellectual potential and prepares them for professional lives in an ever-changing and increasingly interconnected world. It provides a supportive and close-knit learning community, delivering engaging instruction in a flexible variety of formats. Students develop the knowledge to understand a complex world, the skills to act effectively within that world and the wisdom to make good choices. They do so within a community of teachers, staff and peers that is encouraged to add its scholarly, creative and pedagogical contributions to the larger social good.”

THE COLLEGE

Founded in 1932 as the New Hampshire School of Accounting and Secretarial Science, Southern New Hampshire University was granted its degree-granting charter in 1963 and conferred its first bachelor’s degrees three years later. The college became a nonprofit institution under a board of trustees in September 1968; in 1969 its name was shortened to New Hampshire College.
Throughout the next three decades the college continued to grow through the addition of its Schools of Business, Community Economic Development, Education, Liberal Arts, and Professional and Continuing Education. During the ‘90s the college opened off-campus centers to better serve adult learners. Programs now are offered in Laconia, Manchester, Nashua, Portsmouth and Salem, N.H., and in Brunswick, Maine, as well as internationally through such schools as SIT in Malaysia.
A recent article in the Boston Globe describes SNHU’s efforts to lower the cost of high-quality education by offering a “low-frills”’ alternative to the campus-based experience.
SNHU Students Forgo Frills to Save Thousands
Today SNHU boasts a full- and part-time student enrollment of more than 6000 and a full-time faculty of 130; 40 degree-granting programs; a 300-acre campus on the Merrimack River; one of the largest and most dynamic online offerings in New England; and programs as diverse as culinary arts, public economic development, and language education. Students come from more than 23 states and 35 countries, with 80 percent of undergraduates living on campus. More…

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The Anatomy of a Bankable Executive Team

istock-image-org-chart-drawing-woman1

We get hired to build early-stage executive teams by our clients every day. So we’ve seen our fair share of “team-building,” and much of what follows is likely intuitive to many.  It is a combination of our experience and the collective wisdom of more than two dozen early-stage venture capitalists in the North East who we asked the question, “What does a ‘bankable executive team’ mean to you?”

Consider these criteria common denominators, or universal norms for investability. They are by no means exhaustive or complete, as each investor has his or her own individual criteria he or she leverages in selecting portfolio companies.

First, some qualifiers.

¨      Different stages require bankable teams with different profiles: angel versus early stage versus later stage mezzanine/pre-IPO.

¨      Different value kernels drive greater emphasis on one part of the executive team or another.  For a deep science company in biotech, the chief scientist is going to carry greater scrutiny by investors.  This also holds true for a software or hardware company where the technology leader will carry a greater weight.

¨      Investors tend to look at where the risks lie-technology risk or market risk for example.  Something referred to as “execution risk” is all about the team being able to execute on the plan.

¨      Almost all VCs want to see a strong core team consisting of a serially successful CEO, a chief technologist with domain expertise in the area of the company’s product focus, and a veteran sales leader with a relevant rolodex and experience building a team that can score early customer wins.

¨      A strong board of directors, advisors, or scientific advisory board can help immeasurably, although won’t make up for significant lack of experience among the rest of the team.

However, the above is like describing human anatomy as two arms and legs, a head and a torso.  To drill down to more specific details, the grid below outlines the bankable team by function, team, and other characteristics.

The overwhelming preference by investors regarding “bankability” is an “experienced team.”  The majority of VCs we talked to cited their number one concern as experience; those deals that get a ‘hard look’ have this fact in common.  When asked what percentage of all business plans they receive have requisite experience on the team however, the number is well under half.   And we all know that deals get done with first-time teams, even in this difficult financing environment.

Some of the other characteristics-when combined in the right amount and order-that are considered important criteria when an investor looks at financing a start-up team are listed below.

One VC actually tried to capture the essence of a bankable team with a mnemonic-FIRVOC: More…

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Metrics of a Successful Executive Hire

One of the big questions clients, executive search firms, and even executive candidates often try to answer is, “Was the executive I hired a successful hire?”

Metrics might include:

•     Are they still in the seat 6, 12, 18, 24 months in?

•      Or, have they been promoted within X months to a position of greater responsibility?

•     Or, would it be better to measure them against other metrics more specific to the role for which they were hired, like an executive’s MBOs (management by objectives list) or how much of their bonus potential they earned in the first year.

In the book,  The Wisdom of Crowds (http://www.randomhouse.com/features/wisdomofcrowds/ ) , the assertion is made that if you get 100 or more individuals knowledgeable about a certain area to weigh in, there is predictive intelligence created.  The poll below aims to achieve that, and share it back as “leadership catalysts” in our role as retained executive search practitioners.

Please pick 3 from the below that are the most important to you as leader in your organization.  Perhaps picking the #1 or #2 appears self evident, but the #3 might be a bit more interesting to figure out and share with others.

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7 Reasons CEOs Fail

Executive Organization Chart

Is executive retention a problem one might ask?  From our own experiences in search, we felt it was.  Educators and consultants alike have taken a more objective and statistically relevant approach to outlining the problem. A 2001 study of executive failure done by Executive Search Information Exchange pegged the average failure rate for recruited executives in their first year at between 40% and 50%.  More recently Michael Watkins,a recognized thought leader in executive leadership and author of The First 90 Days, has revealed from his research that a staggering 58% of new executives hired from the outside fail in their new position within 18 months.

The cost of executive failure? A Mercer study estimated that it's often more than $500,000 or 2.5 times salary. And this doesn't include organizational, opportunity, productivity, and transitional costs for the new executive (Mercer et al, 1999). Including these other components of executive hiring, the calculus for fully loaded cost to the organization per failure at the executive level can top a million dollars (Fortune Magazine).

After spending a decade or more as an executive recruiter working on early & growth-stage CEO searches, it seems worthwhile to take a look-back on some of the reasons CEOs seem to fail.  In fairness, we’re a boutique firm, so the sample set isn’t hundreds of searches.  However, it’s also more than anecdotal, as for every CEO search we’ve done, there was a high probably that there were several CEOs who had already come before our search, and in doing a thorough CEO replacement search, we are students of why predecessors failed in order to ensure we don’t repeat others’ past mistakes.  Another macro observation is that these failures don’t seem to be different from practice area to practice area, or geographic region to geographic region.  We’re a multi-specialty firm, yet we don’t see that software/ Internet/ media CEOs fail for dramatically different reasons than medical device CEOs or cleantech or biotech CEOs.   Nor is there great variability when you look at CEO searches in one innovation center versus another. With presence in Boston and New England, New York and the Tri-State area, Silicon Valley/San Francisco, and London/Cambridge, England, we’ve been able to test this and haven’t witnessed much foundational difference one area versus another.

The following 7 reasons below cover the vast majority of CEO executive failures we’ve seen:

1.      Failure point #1: Founder “Peter principle.This has been well-documented by others, most notably by John Hamm, venture capitalist at VSP Capital and leadership development coach who authored a Harvard Business Review article a few years back, titled “Why Entrepreneurs Don’t Scale.”  To set up John’s observations, most of our time as executive recruiters, we focus on helping early-stage companies jump the leadership chasm from entrepreneurial to professional leadership.  More often than not, there is absolute certainty that a casualty will occur– the only question is whether that casualty will be the founder(s), or the company.   Where venture capital or private equity is involved, all is done to avoid the latter in favor of the former.  Regardless, it is too rare an occurrence when this collision between founder CEO, growth mandate, and outside investors ends positively, and if the company survives, it has to deal with the emotional baggage of shedding this first founder layer and all the pain this brings with it.   John outlines four management tendencies that work for smaller-company environments but become Achilles’ heels as these CEOs try to scale their companies. The first tendency is loyalty to founding team mates. In entrepreneurial mode, you need to lead as though you’re in charge of a combat unit on the wrong side of enemy lines where anyone on your team is a keeper. However, in larger company growth mode, blind loyalty can become a liability.  At some point, it may be required that the rest of the team that started the company with the CEO may need to be changed out for an executive team with experience at the “growth-stage” versus just the “start-up” stage.   The second tendency, task orientation, is critical in driving toward a big initial product launch, but excessive attention to detail can cause a growing organization to either suffocate under such leadership–one that can’t generate creative ideas or momentum without being instructed by the CEO–or lose sight of its long-term goals. The third tendency, single-mindedness, is important in a visionary CEO who is unleashing a revolutionary product or service on the world.  However,  this can limit the company’s potential as it grows, as all good ideas aren’t always born from one person.  In addition, often a lack of self-awareness or “emotional intelligence” can create a large blind spot around what isn’t working with the original idea, and instead of an ability to iterate to a better but related idea for the marketplace, the founder CEO can become caught up in the initial “vision” and stick to it regardless of external market input that would indicate changes to the initial value proposition are needed to capture broader market adoption. The fourth tendency, working in isolation, is fine for the brilliant scientist focused on an ingenious idea, technology or science. But it’s a non-starter for a leader whose expanding organization increasingly relies on people other than the CEO. There is also a significant difference in skill set required when the company grows beyond a single layer of management, requiring, VPs who manage directors, who may manage managers.  Managing through a multi-layer management system requires a very different managerial toolbox.  As the summary for the article outlines, “Leaders who scale deal honestly with problems and quickly weed out nonperformers. They see past distractions and establish strategic priorities. They learn how to deal effectively with diverse employees, customers, and external constituencies. And, most important, they make the company’s continuing health and welfare their top concern.”

2.      Failure point #2: Unable to “imbed” with the existing team. This is all about forging meaningful bonds, trust, and a following with the existing executive team/staff/employees as the “newcomer.”  This is most often the cause for CEO failure when an outside CEO is brought in as the first successor to the founder CEO.  We refer to it as “organ rejection.”  The host organism (the company) has a high degree of the founder CEO’s DNA in it.  That founder CEO has proven that they are a miracle worker, coming up with the idea, building it out through proof-of-concept on a shoestring budget, getting venture or other funding for the idea, that the rest of the employees who imprinted on the founder CEO “reject” the new CEO as an “imposter” or “foreign matter.”

3.      Failure point #3: Getting sideways with the board. As executive recruiters, we hear this often.  A CEO, whether founder or non-founder, doesn’t gel with the Board of Directors.  In the case of a growth-stage company, there is often outside capital involved, and investors who serve as part or all of the board of directors.  A CEO’s inability to quickly understand the drivers of each board member, and inability to build a communication bridge that may be unique to each board member, is very likely to fail, regardless of whether growth milestones are being hit or not.  One a board member loses faith in a CEO, it’s very hard to win that faith back.  Activities that often alienate a board include hiring issues (holding on to existing employees too long, or holding off on hiring into a key role, board communication issues (not sharing the bad with the good), lack of realism around budgets and burn rate and unwillingness to make the tough decisions, etc.)

4. Failure point #4: Inability to balance revenue/burn rate There is always a constant struggle between CEO and investors if the company has a net burn rate (spending more cash than revenue coming in the door).  Just last week, I heard from a venture capitalist who said that a CEO, during a board meeting, said that he was unwilling to cut the burn rate for fear of being unable to scale fast enough to meet demand once the product “got traction.”  The VC then said, “After the board meeting, I got a call from one of the other investors, expressing concern that the current CEO just didn’t understand the realities of the situation, and he felt it was time to start a search for a new CEO who did.”  Often, this is a circumstance where the CEO has come from a larger company environment, and has rarely if ever faced a situation where “out of cash,” is a literal term, versus just a euphemism for asking the parent corporation for some more capital.

5.      Failure point #5: Inability to hire well. There is an expression, “the first time, shame on you, the second time, shame on me.” This is what the board of directors often employs when a CEO can’t find the right VP level executive to successfully fill a key seat on the management team.  Often, it’s the VP Sales.  When the product is still in development, it’s often the VP Engineering.  However, if the CEO churns either of these positions with several candidates that don’t end up meeting board expectations, ultimately the board feels it’s perhaps not these VPs, but rather the CEO who needs to be changed out.  When a VP Sales commits to a revenue target, and then misses it repeatedly, often the CEO and board decide to make a change in the VP Sales.  multiple replacement in a single role, VP Sales, or VP Engineering) (blaming someone else

6.      Failure point #6: Change of business model. Part of emerging & growth stage company building is the iterative approach to finding the magic business model that takes root and thrives.  At times, founders, investors, and early team members develop a thesis on what model they’re going to chase first, and hire a CEO into that thesis.  However, as often as not, the early iterations miss their mark, and the ultimate business model that evolves as the winner is one that doesn’t play to the strengths of the earlier CEO hired.   In this eventuality, it’s much like “no fault insurance.” Neither driver is at fault, but in the best interests of the company, the earlier CEO hired needs to be changed out to make room for one better tailored for the market approach the company finally settles on as bedrock on which to scale the company.

7.      Failure point #7: Leadership fatigue.  At times, running a company turns into a grind.  The company doesn’t grow as fast as anticipated, or the magic formula for business model doesn’t materialize.  Or the executive team doesn’t come together as all wished at the beginning.  At this point, the company doesn’t fail or flame out, but nor does it continue to show healthy growth and positive direction.  Sometimes, a company grows for a bit, then plateaus and efforts to move the proverbial needle continue to fall short.  One of my favorite expressions comes to mind, “The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over yet expecting a different result.”  If most all other variants and permutations have been tried, no doubt it’s possible that leadership fatigue has set in and the company is in need of a fresh horse.

There certainly are other subsidiary reasons that less often cause failure-a CEO not being technical enough to shepherd a pre-revenue start-up through early product development stages into successful commercialization, or not enough industry domain expertise in an area where a Rolodex of relationships are critical to obtaining early customer wins or market credibility.  However, for the most part, these and many other one-off failures function as exceptions to the larger CEO failure points outlined above.

One of the questions that naturally follows in exploring the most typical reasons for failure is what steps, actions, or changes can be made to optimize the probability for CEO success?  Is there “another way of doing it?”   One of the best ways we’ve found is to split the Chairman and CEO roles.  However, this is a topic for another discussion.  It’s something that’s actually done in the UK as SOP, and even out in Silicon Valley more than in Boston or New York.  We’ve executed our fair share of executive searches in each, and comparing the perspectives around leadership-sharing held by venture or private equity investors is interesting grist for further analysis.

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